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I 
THE “CORRECT” DEFINITION  
OF PROBABILITY – A VERBAL DISPUTE
According to that old adage, if you are going to attack the king, 
you had better kill him. Mises, of course, is our emperor. Crovelli 
(2010) has launched a denunciation of him. In our view, he has not 
at all succeeded. The monarch, of course, cannot respond, but we, 
his courtiers, can. In this paper we will attempt to refute the for-
mer in defense of the latter.
Crovelli, more than once, upbraids Mises for not defining prob-
ability; for using the concepts of case and class probability, without 
ever explicating what these two branches have in common. And, 
this is a legitimate, although somewhat minor, criticism of Ludwig 
von Mises. In fact we observe that “probability” is essentially 
mathematical in meaning, whether we consult Wolfram Math-
World which states:
“Probability is the branch of mathematics that studies the possible 
outcomes of given events together with the outcomes’ relative 
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likelihoods and distributions. In common usage, the word “proba-
bility” is used to mean the chance that a particular event (or set of 
events) will occur expressed on a linear scale from 0 (impossibility) 
to 1 (certainty), also expressed as a percentage between 0 and 100%. 
The analysis of events governed by probability is called statistics.
There are several competing interpretations of the actual “mean-
ing” of probabilities. Frequentists view probability simply as a 
measure of the frequency of outcomes (the more conventional inter-
pretation), while Bayesians treat probability more subjectively as a 
statistical procedure that endeavors to estimate parameters of an 
underlying distribution based on the observed distribution”,1
or the OED:
“probability, n. 3. Mathematics. As a measurable quantity: the 
extent to which a particular event is likely to occur, or a particular 
situation be the case, as measured by the relative frequency of 
occurrence of events of the same kind in the whole course of expe-
rience, and expressed by a number between 0 and 1.
An event that cannot happen has probability 0; one that is certain 
to happen has probability 1. Probability is commonly estimated by 
the ratio of the number of successful cases to the total number of 
possible cases, derived mathematically using known properties of 
the distribution of events, or estimated logically by inferential or 
inductive reasoning (when mathematical concepts may be inappli-
cable or insufficient).”
Mises defines/explains what he means by class probability and 
case probability, but granted that MathWorld didn’t exist at the 
time he wrote, how difficult would it have been for him to provide 
a standard, authoritative definition of probability? Moreover, the 
dichotomy between class and case probability strictly coincides 
with the Knightian (1921) distinction between risk and uncer-
tainty, which preceded Mises’ terminology by decades. Ludwig 
von Mises maintains (thereby siding with his brother, Richard von 
Mises (…)) that it is only class probability that yields itself to numer-
ical expression, whereas case probability does not. If we take the 
1 http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Probability.html
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position that “probability” may (also) be manifested in non-math-
ematical ways, it does not take much to realize that this generic 
concept can be divided into two sub-species: the deficiency in our 
knowledge about statements can have a numerical expression or 
not, therefore, we end up with numerical probability (class proba-
bility) and non-numerical probability (case-probability); i.e., what 
Knight termed risk and uncertainty, respectively. How much sim-
pler and less confusing had Mises but used Knight’s terminology.
To illustrate the above, let us consider the following: what is 
the probability that Crovelli will write and publish a response to 
our rejoinder? We are inclined to say (following Richard von 
Mises’s insight) that this question is meaningless; that is, the 
probability of the above statement cannot be given any numeri-
cal value.2 And now again, we can almost hear Crovelli reply: 
“Aha, they beg the question! The correct definition of probability 
is the very point at issue and Wysocki-Block assume away the 
possibility that probabilities of singular events can be judged 
numerically.” But this criticism is wrong. We are not merely 
assuming anything away. We now ask what number can possi-
bly be placed on the probability that Crovelli will react to us, and 
defy him to comply with this request.3 Obviously, he cannot do 
any such thing.
What matters to us is that when it comes to risk, assigning 
numerical values to a chance of the occurrence of an attribute in 
question is valid, whereas in the case of singular events it is not, 
and cannot be. We thus preserve the traditional distinction 
between risk and uncertainty.
2 This statement would not even be false if there were an infinite number of alter-
native universes (DeWitt and Graham, 1973; Everett, 1957; Howell, 2018; Moskowitz, 
2011; Tipler, 2005, 2012, 2014), and in some of them Crovelli did respond to our present 
essay, and in some of them he did not. For in each of them it would be entirely up to 
his freely made decision, his free will (Block, 2015; Van Schoelandt, 2016), to determine 
whether or not he did so. We could still not generate any meaningful probabilistic 
number. Unlike a coin flip, or a throw of the dice, all of these “observations” would not 
be anything like identical.
3 We sympathetically interpret Crovelli’s claim about the possibility of assigning 
probabilities to singular events. To do so, we resort to the so-called betting quotient. 
However, this author fails to offer any principle for assigning probabilities to singular 
events whatsoever.
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Let us press this point even harder so that we can satisfy our 
adversary. What about defining probability as uncertainty as 
such. This generic category (genus proximum) would then split 
into two subspecies: risk and mere uncertainties. And what, in 
turn, are the differentia specificae of each of them? We suggest that 
the former can be assigned a numerical value, whereas the latter 
cannot. What is more, we submit that when it comes to the for-
mer, probability would attach to a propositional function4, while 
the latter lies somewhere between absolute certainty and abso-
lute impossibility, which effectively means that any attempt at a 
numerical assessment would come to naught. Do we beg the 
question here? As long as we adhere to the common parlance 
(insofar as technical economics is concerned), the burden of proof 
remains with Crovelli.
So, what is this author’s substantive criticism of Mises? Is it that 
since Mises is a subjectivist on some, many issues, he is logically 
inconsistent in not adopting this stance across the board, to wit, to 
probability? But why ever just because a person adopts a certain 
analytic tool to address one problem, must he utilize it for cases in 
which it patently does not apply? If all you have is a hammer, then 
every challenge starts to look like a nail, at least for Crovelli.
This is evidenced by the following quote:
“The conclusion that must be drawn from this, therefore, is that 
the brothers von Mises are right to say that numerical probabilities 
cannot legitimately be applied to singular cases, if numerical prob-
ability is defined virtually synonymously with the relative fre-
quency method. They are wrong to make this claim, however, if 
probability is defined as a subjective measure of man’s uncer-
tainty” (Crovelli, M 2010: 12).
4 For example, “the probability of a car accident caused by the inhabitants of Colo-
rado in 2018” should be understood as the probability of “x causes a car accident in 
2018”, where x is an inhabitant of Colorado. This in turn would reduce to the ratio of 
those x’s which render the propositional function true to the whole range of the varia-
ble. Since there are about 5,6 million people in Colorado, the probability of the above 
propositional function is the ratio of the people from Colorado that actually caused an 
accident 2018 to the overall number of people from that state. For the analysis of pro-
bability as predicated upon propositional functions (and not propositions) see: Mackie 
(1973, pp. 187–88).
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Let us now, arguendo, take Crovelli’s (2010: 12) definition of 
probability for granted. Our adversary contends that “probability 
is defined as a subjective measure of man’s uncertainty”. Now let 
us see what follows if we take Crovelli’s above-cited definition to 
its logical extreme. Because subjective measures in and of them-
selves may not involve cardinal numbers, the probability calculus 
may never use cardinal numbers either. But now modus tollens 
kicks in: of course probability calculus resorts to cardinal num-
bers; therefore, probability should not be identified with a “subjec-
tive measure of man’s uncertainty”.
One concession is due at this point. We are always willing and 
able to grant the point to Crovelli: yes, there are Knightian uncer-
tainties/Misesean Case5 probabilities (Crovelli’s singular events) 
that cannot be given any numerical value.6 On the other hand, our 
substantive (and not definitional!) claim is that there are some 
Knightian risks and Mises class probabilities that matter precisely 
because they can be assigned numerical probabilities.7
This scholar also errs when he claims (2010: 7) “that the very 
existence of probability is predicated on the existence of uncer-
tainty.” Close, but no cigar. Take the case of dice or card games. We 
know all about them, there is no uncertainty about their results at 
all, at least not a as a central tendency as moments of a probability 
distribution or moment generating function. We know with great 
exactitude, for example, all there is to be known about the odds of 
pulling a straight flush, or rolling a snake eyes. We know rather 
5 The invocation of Knightian uncertainty and Misesian case probability; or of 
Knigtian risks and Misesian class probability may look confusing but the we regard 
the terms used in the first pair as synonymous with each other and the same applies 
to the second pair. Both Knight and Mises resorted to natural language to express 
their ideas and in natural languages, alas, two distinct words may have the same 
denotation.
6 The only hope of assigning probabilities to them is to invoke the betting quo-
tient, which Crovelli fails to do. We in turn provide it in the forthcoming section belie-
ving it is the only possible interpretation that Crovelli’s subjective probabilities can be 
given so as to count as rational and to obey the standards of probability calculus.
7 We conceive of probability qualifications as applying in general to statements 
about which we are uncertain. We posit that this is uncontroversial enough such that 
Crovelli is barred from the counterclaim that what uncertainty is is not yet established 
and we thus beg the question by invoking the term uncertainty in the first place.
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less about any given hand, or roll of the dice, except for the long-
run probability of their occurring in the case of large numbers. 
These phenomena are all objective. In the event of large numbers, 
we expect the odds of any one die8 appearing as 16.66%. The same 
cannot be said about the chance of Trump winning the election for 
president in 2020. There will not be an indefinitely large number of 
such voting and even if there were, we would still be a ship in the 
night with no compass or rudder. We could of course guess, and 
even make educated guesses based on polling, past experiences, 
etc. But empirical generalizations such as in games of chance are 
beyond us. But that does not mean that this type of probability is 
“subjective” either. Rather, voting patterns are objective. Will peo-
ple pull this lever or that one. As far as we disinterested observers 
are concerned, this are objective facts, to be discerned, but only 
after the election in late 2019.
II 
NECESSARY STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON SUBJECTIVE 
INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY – PROBABILITY AXIOMS 
AS NORMS OF RATIONALITY
What the word probability must necessarily connote to be worthy of 
its name is some sort of numerical expression; or else, our account 
would be rendered totally fallacious (and uninteresting at best).9 
Salmon (1966, 64) – among others – invokes the criterion of admis-
sibility, which reads as follows:
“We say that an interpretation of a formal system is admissible if 
the meanings assigned to the primitive terms in the interpretation 
8 The expectation is all the more reasonable if we conclude that the coin or the die 
is physically and geometrically symmetric etc.
9 Note that Misesian idea of probability allows for numerical assessment in the 
case of class probability. Alas, the same cannot be said about Crovelli’s account. The 
latter promises to deliver some ground for assigning probabilities to singular events 
but we look in vain for any principles related thereto in the author’s entire corpus. This 
section is aimed at charitably interpreting what Crovelli might have in mind so that at 
least some abstract structural properties of probability calculus can be satisfied.
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transform the formal axioms, and consequently all the theorems, 
into true statements. A fundamental requirement for probability 
concepts is to satisfy the mathematical relations specified by the 
calculus of probability […].”
As subjectivist accounts purport to measure a degree of belief, the 
main challenge posed thereto is how to measure the degrees of those 
mental states, which are of qualitative, rather than of quantitative, 
nature. In other words, even if we accept that the degree of belief can 
be given a numerical value, these values must obey the axioms of 
probability calculus (which are to be cited shortly). Now, the only 
technique of translating actions into subjective beliefs (strictly speak-
ing, the subjective probabilities we attach to given outcomes) availa-
ble to us is the so-called betting quotient.10 It is said11 to inversely 
reflect subjective probabilities. In fact, the relation between betting 
quotients and subjective probabilities is that of equivalence. For 
instance, assume we believe that the probability that A will occur is 
1/3 and that it will not take place (event B will eventuate instead) is 
2/3 (with the latter event being a complement of the former). Then, 
we are ready to bet at least at the odds 2:1 for the former as against 
the latter. In other words, we must be offered at least twice as much 
money when we bet on A because we find it twice as unlikely as 
event B. And conversely, if we are going to bet on A when offered at 
least twice as much (as compared to betting on B), the implied subjec-
tive probabilities are 1/3 that A will occur and 2/3 that B will happen.
The next thing to consider is how a person cherishing some 
belief (to a certain degree) reacts to buying or selling specific bets.12 
Let us assume that a person assigns the subjective probability .75 
to proposition P. From this we can deduce that he would be ready 
to buy a bet promising $1 in case the proposition is true and $0 oth-
erwise, for no more than $.75. In particular, if this individual buys 
10 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dutch-book/
11 On the idea that it is our beliefs about probabilities attached to some outcomes that 
guide our actions and that, therefore, our actions can be used to (retrospectively) deduce 
the (subjective) probabilities, see, for instance: de Finetti (2008) and Ramsey (1926).
12 The idea that beliefs guide our actions is exploited by de Finetti (2008) and this 
allows him to infer probabilities (the degrees of cherished beliefs) from actions (here, 
accepting or rejecting particular bets).
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at the price of $ .75 exactly, his expected value equals zero since the 
price he pays for the wager is the same as the expected value of the 
bet given his belief ($1× .75 = $ .75) What is more, this person would 
also sell this wager (that is, he would bet on not-P instead of on P) 
for no more than $ .25. Generally speaking, if the man assigns a 
probability of x (with x being a percentage) to proposition P, he is 
ready to pay no more than $x for the wager promising $1 when P 
turns out to be true and promising $0 otherwise.
The above analysis could serve as a charitable perusal of Crovel-
li’s work because this author is rather uninformative on how he 
would go about deducing the promised numerical (objective) proba-
bilities to events based on his subjective assessments. After this brief 
introduction, let us scrutinize the relevant material from Crovelli.
Now, here is a philosophical howler. Our author maintains the 
coherence of “assigning numerical probabilities to singular cases”. 
Crovelli (2010) introduces this apparent coherence as follows:
“Since, as was just seen, the legitimacy of assigning numerical 
probabilities to singular cases depends inexorably on the defini-
tion of probability, it is important to determine which definition of 
probability fits in with the rest of Ludwig von Mises’s epistemo-
logical and praxeological system” (Mises, L [1949]1988: 12).
Crovelli is here adamant about stressing the priority of the defini-
tion of probability itself, which, as noted above, places semantic 
issues over substantive ones – in particular, it may dismiss frequen-
tialism out of hand without even bothering to consider whether it is 
a valid method of generating (we fear to say it) probabilities (the 
chances of the occurrence of a given attribute within a well-specified 
reference group). Strangely enough, Crovelli is tellingly mute on how 
these numerical probabilities assigned to singular events are to be 
computed. In the most likelihood, the main thrust of his paper13 is to 
argue for assigning probabilities to singular events but one may look 
but in vain to find anything informative delivered on the subject.
13 He even wrote a separate essay on “The Possibilities of Assigning Probabilities 
to Singular Cases, Or: Probability is Subjective Too!”; (Crovelli, 2009) which also fails 
to deliver the promised computation method.
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What is worse, there is a symptomatic footnote no. 29 (Crovelli 
M, 2010: 11-12) in which Crovelli plays out his hand admitting that 
probabilities are merely his opinions. He does this in his criticism 
of Hoppe (1997):
“We are thus free to attack and dispute probabilities as useless, 
inaccurate or even self-contradictory, (as does professor Hoppe in 
his thorough demolition of the use of probability in the rational 
expectations model in Hoppe (1997)), but, if we are to be faithful to 
subjectivist definition, we do not have a right to condemn other 
men’s numbers as ‘not probabilities,’ just because we disagree with 
how they are generated. Just as we have no right to condemn another 
man’s opinion as ‘not an opinion’, solely because we disagree with 
it, so too do we lack any right to condemn his probabilities as ‘not 
probabilities’, solely because we disagree with how they are gener-
ated. This is true, quite frankly, because probabilities are opinions.”
So here we have it: an open statement identifying probabilities 
with opinions. It is difficult to come up with more of a “smoking 
gun” than this. Yet, these “opinions” should at least obey the axi-
oms of probability. To strengthen out argument, let us proceed 
assuming, arguendo, that probabilities are indeed mere opinions. 
Our challenge is this: would Crovelli conceive of these opinions as 
free-floating and not obeying any axioms of probability? We claim 
that if this author sticks to the former, he would be proved irra-
tional and would lose money to a cunning bookie. Now let us 
recall three axioms of probability, as expressed by Swinburne 
(2002: 5-6) holding for all classes A, B and C:
1) Pr (A|B) ≥ 0,14
which basically says that given whatever type of event that occurred 
(B), the probability of event A is a non-negative real number.
14 The formulas from Swinburne (2002) expressly refer to sets. However, they can 
be easily extended to propositions too. Actually, it is the latter interpretation, that is 
assigning probabilities to propositions, that Crovelli has in mind. Despite possible 
ambiguities, the reader can infer from the context whether it is the probability of a 
proposition or the probability of a given set (given some logical space) that is meant.
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2) If B⊆A, Pr(A|B) = 115,
which means that if B is a subset (proper subset inclusive) of A, then 
the occurrence of A given B is certain. Let us consider some simple 
mathematical examples and illustrate the above rule for B being a 
proper subset of A (when B is not a proper subset then B=A, which 
is trivially true). Let B denote all the natural numbers divisible by 3 
and A – all the natural numbers divisible by 6. Since whatever is 
divisible by 6 is also divisible by 3, but not vice versa (since the latter 
must be also divisible by 2), we conclude that the natural numbers 
divisible by 6 constitute a proper subset of the numbers divisible by 
3. Then, once we know that, we know that for every x, where x is 
divisible by 6, the probability of those x’s being divisible by 3 too is 
1. What is more, this axiom is also given a more intuitive rendition 
in terms of tautologies or necessary truths.16; that is:
(2)  if A is a tautology17, then pr(A)=1 [Normalization], with this 
condition being sometimes replaced by
(2’) if A is a logical truth, then pr(A)=1
or even
(2’’) if AA is a necessary truth, then pr(A)=1
15 In the original formulation by Kolgomorov (1950), the second axiom assumed 
the following expression: P(Ω)=1; that is, if the event exhausts the entire logical space, 
it must be certain (in particular, the probability of a tautology or any necessary truth 
equals 1). This holds true for the probability of the sums which, when put together, 
exhaust the entire logical space. For example, the probability of raining or not raining 
tomorrow in Denver equals 1 for there is no third state of affairs imaginable.
16 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dutch-book/
17 This word has a different meaning in philosophy and in mathematics. In the 
former case, it applies to statements that are true by definition, that yield information, 
only, about how we choose to use nomenclature. For example, “Bachelors are unma-
rried men.” In the latter case, tautology refers to a statement in formal (symbolic) logic 
which is true regardless of the interpretation of its variables (that is, it is true merely 
by virtue of its operators) as long as the interpretation of the same variables is identical 
all along the statement. To illustrate, the statement “either x or not-x” is true whatever 
x stands for as long as we always substitute the same phrase for x.. For instance, in one 
interpretation (substitution), we end up with “it will either rain or not rain”, which is 
also tautologically true.
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3) If A∩B∩C = 0, Pr(A∪B|C)= Pr (A|C) + Pr(B|C)
To put the third axiom simply, for any two disjoint sets of events, 
the probability of the sum thereof is the sum of their respective 
probabilities. Sticking to our elementary arithmetics, we can 
exemplify axiom 3 by the following truth: the probability of a 
given number being either a real or an imaginary18 number is the 
same as the probability for this number to be real plus the proba-
bility for it to be imaginary.
Having said that, and even granting for the sake of argument 
that probabilities might be Crovelli-like subjective opinions, we 
claim that these opinions (probabilistically qualified) must still 
obey the above-stated axioms. Therefore, we doubt whether Crov-
elli with his ‘probabilities as opinions’ would be willing and able 
to undertake certain bets against us. Let us see first what the vio-
lation of axiom 1 consists of and how a bookie could exploit an 
agent guilty of committing this logical fallacy.
What if an agent’s betting quotient is negative? In this case a 
bookie buys the bet yielding $1 if proposition P transpires to be 
true and $0 otherwise. Since the agent’s betting quotient is nega-
tive, the bookie is able to buy the wager for a negative price. Now, 
note that the agent is obliged to pay to the bookie $1 if P is true and 
$0 otherwise, with non-zero expected payment to the bookie.19 
Generally speaking, the problem with negative quotients (and 
hence, with the violation of axiom 1) is that the bookie pays the neg-
ative price for the bet and then is guaranteed (with the exception 
stated in the footnote 22) a positive payment, which effectively ren-
ders the agent worse off by necessity. In the light of all this, would 
Crovelli be so bold as to claim that probabilities (and therefore bet-
ting quotients) can be negative? Hardly. Let us now see how a man 
violating axiom 2 would run the risk of a ‘Dutch book’20 being 
18 Note that real numbers and imaginary numbers constitute non-overlapping 
sets, with non-overlapping sets being an antecedent of the axiom 3.
19 With one exception: if P is impossibility, then the agent would necessarily owe 
$0 to the bookie.
20 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dutch-book/
256 IGOR WYSOCKI Y WALTER E. BLOCK, PH.D.
made against him. Let us adduce the pertinent fragment from 
Swinburne (2002: 8) again:
“So, if contrary to the axioms of the calculus, you judge that in a 
two-horse race (with no ties allowed) both horses have a probabil-
ity of 2/3 of winning and so you bet £2 on each at 1–2. Then you 
will inevitably lose £1 whatever the result of the race. This kind of 
argument has been extended so as to apply where people do not 
bet in a literal sense, but where the gains and losses resulting from 
their actions are measured in terms of their value to the agent 
rather in monetary terms, so as to show that being guided by prob-
abilities which do not conform to the constrains of the calculus 
will lead in various circumstances to inevitable loss.”
As far as betting quotients for tautologies are concerned, let us 
analyze the two-fold way an agent might err when betting on nec-
essary truths. Let us assume that an agent assigns to some neces-
sary truth the probability of .9. Then a bookie buys the bet (for at 
least $.90) and now the agent bets against a necessary truth, which 
means that he will pay $1 to the bookie. All in all, the agent loses 
at most $.10 to the bookie.
Suppose an agent estimates the probability of a necessary truth 
as higher than 1? Then the bookie sells the wager (for at least $1) 
promising to pay $1 if P turns out to be true and $0 otherwise. 
Since P is ex hypothesi a necessary truth, the bookie will pay $1 to 
the agent but since the former sold the bet for at least $1, it is again 
the bookie who benefits and it is again the agent who loses. Then 
again, do Crovelli’s probabilities as opinions allow for numerical 
values (if his subjective probabilities are about numerical values at 
all) for necessary truths other than 1? If so, we would like to engage 
in some bets with this author. In short, what we hopefully man-
aged to demonstrate in this section is that even if Crovelli’s subjec-
tive probabilities (measuring the degrees of his beliefs) may be 
quantitatively interpreted in terms of betting quotients, they must 
conform to the three axioms of probability. After all, what matters 
are degrees of rational beliefs. And any set of beliefs that guaran-
tees a loss to an agent regardless of the outcome of a bet can by no 
means be labeled in any such way.
CROVELLI ON PROBABILITY: A CRITIQUE  257
To conclude this section, let us see how the ideas put forward 
here apply to both Howden (2009) and Crovelli (2009b). What will 
come handy is the idea that betting quotients reflect implied prob-
abilities and that the latter must obey some structural constraints; 
or else – one party to a certain set of bets must inevitably suffer a 
loss – whatever the outcome thereof.
Now, let us see how Howden (2009: 3 – 4) conceives of odd-mak-
ers setting odds for a boxing match:
“Last, Crovelli asserts that probability can be applied to unique 
trials, and not confined to repeatable series as frequency probabil-
ity theorists contend. For example, the fact that casinos and book-
ies seem to successfully profit from applying probabilities to the 
odds they offer on unique events (i.e., boxing matches) provides 
visible proof that accurate probability distributions can be calcu-
lated for singular events. However, while the appearance of odds 
may seem like a probability estimate of the fight’s outcome, this is 
merely an illusion fabricated by an odds-maker. In distinction, the 
odds-maker only has to have an estimate of who will win and who 
will lose a fight. The odds established are used to entice individu-
als to bet against the expected winner, in hopes of pocketing more 
winnings. The degree of entrepreneurial forecasting will deter-
mine how well the odds-maker has persuaded betters to errone-
ously choose the wrong player. The oddsmaker does not partake 
in an exercise in probability, but rather one of entrepreneurial 
forecasting. To be sure, past matches may be used to aid the entre-
preneur in assigning his or her expected likelihood as to which 
contestant will emerge victorious from a particular boxing match. 
However, to say that there are 2:1 odds that boxer A will out-spar 
boxer B does not imply that the bookie expects boxer A to be victo-
rious two-thirds of any one fight, nor that the final outcome will 
be two-thirds of a victory for A, and one-third for B. For unique 
events, there can only be one outcome which may not rely on the 
established frequency distribution. Instead, the odds are entrepre-
neurially forecast based upon an expectation that boxer A will 
prevail, and that the greatest profit will be earned by enticing indi-
viduals to seek higher pecuniary rewards by betting for the 
expected loser in the fight.”
Here is Crovelli’s (2009B: 2 – 3) reply:
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“Mr. Howden’s extremely important discussion of odds-makers in 
this section also deserves notice. In my paper I claimed that since 
bookies and casinos are able to consistently generate accurate odds 
for singular events and phenomena like boxing matches this is strong 
prima fascia evidence that non-frequentist methods for generating 
numerical probabilities were not ‘meaningless,’ as the brothers von 
Mises had claimed. Mr. Howden will have none of this, and he 
denounces such odds as ‘an illusion fabricated by an odds-maker’[…]. 
His reason for denying that such odds are probabilities, however, is 
almost embarrassingly question begging. Indeed, his evidence that 
such odds are not probabilities amounts to nothing more than a mis-
taken restatement of how bookies go about generating odds […].”
However, we demur. We claim that in the light of what was said 
above about the necessary structural properties of reasonable 
beliefs (about underlying probabilities), it seems obvious that the 
only method bookies must resort to have a sure-fire gain is to set 
odds (coupled with their respective prices) so that the implied 
probabilities (which are inversely reflected by the set odds) add up 
to more than one.
Let us now illustrate how bookies (resorting to the sheer neces-
sity of probability calculus) trump any considerations of whether 
they “generate accurate odds” or “entice individuals to seek higher 
pecuniary rewards by betting for the expected loser.”21 Now let us 
imagine there is a heavyweight boxing match between Mr. A and 
Mr. B and a bookie sets odds in the following manner
a)  1:1 – Mr. A’s victory against his loss or a draw (the betting 
price is $50)
b)  2:1 – Mr. B’s victory against his loss or a draw (the betting 
price is $33,3(3))
c)  3:1 – there is a draw rather than a conclusive result (the bet-
ting price is $25)22
21 Obviously, the latter makes a lot of sense but the point is, in a sense, rather tri-
vial. Everybody would bet on “the expected loser” only if the odds for him are higher. 
In another sense, however, nobody bets on an expected loser, for if they truly believe 
he is going to lose, they would not bet on him in the first place.
22 It is another example of a bookie creating a Dutch book, which means that he 
will necessarily benefit at the expense of an average gambler (which also is compatible 
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The implied probabilities of Mr. A’s victory and Mr. B’s victory, 
and a draw between them are, respectively, 1/2, 1/3 and 1/4 which, 
when added together, yield more than 1, that is 13/12. Given that, 
we know that there is such a configuration of betting prices such 
that a gain is guaranteed to a bookie in the long run23.
Let us analyze all the possible outcomes. We posit that the 
prices are set in such a manner that the bookie always pays $100 
(whatever the result, returning the bet price plus paying the stake) 
but he collects $50 + $ 33,3(3) + $25, adding up to $108,3(3), which 
guarantees a sure-fire gain of $8,3(3). As demonstrated, what it 
takes to succeed concerns neither guessing the probabilities of 
these unique events correctly nor enticing individuals to bet on the 
expected loser (in this example: a tie, which obviously implies the 
highest odds but there is still only one individual betting on this 
outcome). Rather, this stems from the pure mathematics of the sit-
uation.
In conclusion, betting quotients (and hence implied probabili-
ties) is a powerful weapon which allows bookies to make gains 
with confidence without resorting to any entrepreneurial skills at 
all. On the contrary, what it takes is the knowledge of calculus and 
the realization that when the probabilities of disjointed events 
(exhausting the logical space) add up to more than one, a bookie 
will certainly benefit while individuals betting on particular out-
comes only gamble and therefore, they can either lose or gain.
III 
THE STATISTICAL PROBABILITY – THE EXISTENCE OF 
COLLECTIVES – A MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT FOR CROVELLI 
(CASINOS, INSURANCE MARKET ETC.)
The other reason why Crovelli is erroneous is that statistical prob-
ability is a fact. Casinos necessarily benefit as they are acutely 
with the fact that some particular gamblers will be rendered better off as a result of the 
bet. After all, one of the outcomes necessarily occurs and there are some bets placed 
on it).
23 Out of the infinitely many such prices, one set is specified above.
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aware of the underlying probabilities in games of chance (the 
probabilities being normally arrived at via the frequentist 
method!). There is an obvious advantage of empirically obtained 
frequencies over merely assumed equiprobabilities of possible 
outcomes (as in the classical definition with its adherence to the 
principle of indifference24) as well as over subjective (degrees of 
beliefs) probabilities.
To that effect, let us quote Mackie (1973:161):
“The classical definition, thus developed, will identify the proba-
bility of a possible event with the ratio of the number of ‘favoura-
ble’ possibilities to the total number of possibilities in a set of 
equiprobable possibilities. What is essential in this procedure is 
the use of the principle of indifference (or of insufficient reason) to 
determine equiprobability, that is, the claim that alternatives are 
equally probable is we have no reason to expect one rather than 
another. Now with some sense of ‘probable’, this principle would 
be simply false. E.g. with a limiting frequency sense: a die may be 
loaded, and we may not know this; if so, we have no reason to 
expect it to fall 6 uppermost rather than, say, 2 uppermost, and yet 
the limiting frequency of the former may be markedly higher than 
the limiting frequency of the latter.”
First, once the limiting frequency value is established (for exam-
ple, a dice falls 6 uppermost slightly more often than 2), this result 
is obviously much more informative than the mere assumption of 
the principle of indifference (that is, in the absence of any other 
information on relative frequencies, as in the classical definition of 
probability cited above). Second, and more crucially, let us imagine 
that Crovelli has just been tossing a coin for hours and has thus far 
obtained the .7 frequency of heads and only .3 frequency of tails. 
In the light of that, what should Crovelli’s reasonable belief consist 
of?25 Should he stick to the classical definition and ascertain that 
since all the forthcoming tosses are independent and there are 
24 The formulation of classical definition is normally attributed to Laplace (1814), 
whereas it was Keynes (1921) who came up with the principle of indifference inten-
ding to overcome the shortcomings (esp. the apparent circularity) of the former.
25 We assume we are dealing with an equally weighted, or “fair” coin.
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merely two possibilities, the principle of indifference26 commits 
him to say that the probability of each and every next toss is still 
1/2? Or should he cherish any belief now since after all “probabili-
ties are opinions”? But this sheer ignorance27 is unjustified since 
Crovelli has already obtained some information, that is the rela-
tive frequencies of heads and tails as a result of his long-run exper-
iment.
This point is pellucidly illustrated by Mackie (1973: 201):
“What is, at any moment, reasonable for someone to believe is rela-
tive to the information that he then has. But of course if he could 
easily get further relevant information, and the problem is of some 
importance to him, it will be sensible for him to get that information 
first […]. A judgement based on a greater quantity of relevant infor-
mation is a better judgement. And if we are asked how it is better, we 
can say without blushing that it is more likely to be right. Admit-
tedly, in the particular case where a penny is in fact unbiased, the 
man who bases his opinion as to whether it will fall heads at the 
next toss on the principle of indifference applied directly to the 
alternatives ‘heads’ and ‘tails’ will be no less likely to be right than 
the man who, by a long series of trials, first confirms the hypothesis 
that the limiting frequency for heads is ½ and then applies the prin-
ciple of indifference […] But this is a particular case. If we start off 
not knowing whether the penny is biased or not, it is clearly reason-
able to say that the man who experiment thoroughly is more likely 
to be right even about a single later result.”
The final statement is very powerful indeed. When applied to 
our imaginary scenario with Crovelli running the experiment 
which yielded .7 frequency of heads, it directly implies that the 
26 We are using this term in a very different manner than that rejected by Aus-
trian economics. See on that:
Barnett, 2003; Block, 1980, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009A, 2009B, Block and Barnett, 2010; 
Callahan, 2003; Collingwood, 1945; Hoppe, 2005; Hulsmann, 1999; Machaj, 2007; Roth-
bard, 2004, pp. 265, 267; Wysocki, 2016; Wysocki and Block, 2018.
27 What we mean by that is, technically speaking, the maximum entropy; that is, 
out of k events, each is 1/k probable. In our case (tossing a coin), the highest entropy 
(which is the smallest amount of information possible) commits us to ascertain the 
probability of 1/2 to either event, be it either falling heads or tails. For details, see: Sha-
nnon (1948).
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information about the obtained relative frequencies should have a 
bearing even on the reasonable degree of belief about any future 
tosses.28 In other words, equipped with the principle of indiffer-
ence and the above-stated relative frequencies , Crovelli (as an 
adherent of subjective probabilities) should believe that the proba-
bility of tossing heads at any future29 single toss is .7. With the 
acquisition of the relative frequencies of heads and tails the princi-
ple of indifference basically says that if do not know anything over 
and above the mere fact that this particular coin exhibits a slight 
bias in favor of heads, our expectation as to any further tosses 
should be adjusted accordingly. Mackie goes further than either of 
the Mises brothers30 and implies that the obtained frequencies 
(coupled with the principle of indifference) may serve to derive the 
corresponding probability of “a single later result”; that is, if all 
Crovelli knows is that this very coin exhibits such and such fre-
quencies of the two attributes in question, he should reasonably 
believe that at any later toss, the probability of heads is .7, and that 
of tails is .3. Yet, this would be most unwelcome to Crovelli since it 
would treat frequencies as prior to beliefs.31 We can only conclude 
that this author to the contrary notwithstanding it is the acquired 
information (knowledge) that helps to adjust our beliefs and not 
vice versa.
There is an empirical argument for the validity of frequentialist 
sort of probability, and that is mass phenomena. After all, there are 
28 Certainly, we should bear in mind that Richard von Mises would find the pro-
bability of any single toss utterly meaningless.
29 Assuming that throughout the experiment the physical properties of the die 
are not subject to any changes.
30 Let us recall that neither von Mises brother would draw from the fact of class 
probability any numerical conclusions related to case probabilities. To that effect, Lud-
wig von Mises [1949] 1998, p. 107) said: “Class probability means: We know or assume 
to know, with regard to the problem concerned, everything about the behavior of a 
whole class of events or phenomena; but about the actual singular events or pheno-
mena we know nothing but that they are elements of this class.”
31 This finding is another reasonable objection to purely subjective interpreta-
tions of probability: not only should subjective beliefs be constrained by probability 
axioms cited above but also prior probabilities cannot be purely arbitrary. If Crovelli 
tossed a coin one hundred times in a row and at each and every toss, it landed on 
heads, it should give him pause. It would be odd for him to subjectively believe that at 
the next toss the chance is fifty-fifty that tails will appear.
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the phenomena which exhibit limiting frequency value and satisfy 
the property of randomness (which is understood as insensitivity 
to the method of place selection)32, as specified by Richard von 
Mises (1981 [1957]: 24):
“If the same method, or any other, simple or complicated, method 
of selection is applied to the sequence of dice casts, the effect will 
always be nil; the relative frequency of the double 6, for instance, 
will remain, in all selected partial sequences, the same as in the 
original one (assuming, of course, that the selected sequences are 
long enough to show an approach to the limiting value), This 
impossibility of affecting the chances of a game by a system of 
selection, this uselessness of all systems of gambling, is the char-
acteristic decisive property common to all sequences of observa-
tions of mass phenomena which form the proper subject of 
probability calculus.”
It is precisely for this reason that casinos cannot be outplayed. 
Even the most cunning gambler is unable to come up with the 
method of place selection that would change the relative frequen-
cies (say, of an unbiased dice) in his favour and let him have an edge 
over the casino. This, as labelled by Mises (1981 [1957]: 24), “com-
plete lawlessness” is just a brute fact. The consecutive throws of an 
unbiased dice may constitute a collective but we can never be sure 
a priori33 whether this dice is unbiased until we prove that it really 
is by experimentally demonstrating that the throws thereof con-
form to the principle of randomness and exhibit limiting frequency 
value of 1/2 in the long run. Therefore, and more generally, if a 
given population approaches some limiting frequency and is ran-
dom (that is insensitive to place selection)34, then given the proba-
bility of a given attribute obtained via frequency method, we can 
32 “Place selection” is simply selecting some proper sub-set out of our original 
collective. Insensitivity to place selection means that the frequency of a given attribute 
(in the original collective) is not going to change in the target sub-class.
33 Note that on frequentist approach, a priori probability is in principle empirica-
lly refutable.
34 Certainly, insensitivity to all place selections would be too strong a require-
ment for any finite series. After all, there are such sub-series that would change the 
frequency of an attribute. Yet, Mises’ point fully applies to infinite series.
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apply to this population all the fundamental operations of proba-
bility calculus. And such populations do occur. It is via frequential-
ist method that a dice is tested for being unbiased; that is if all the 
outcomes approach the limiting frequency value of 1/6, only then 
can a dice be said to be unbiased. No a priori probability of the 
principle of indifference (in the absence of any prior information) 
would do. In his magnum opus, Mises (1981 [1957]) cites many pop-
ulations which constitute collectives – the examples range from 
games of chance to mortality rates35 (exploited by insurance com-
panies and analyzed by actuarial mathematics). In short, whether 
a population is a collective is an empirical issue and should be not 
dismissed out of hand by any stipulative definition of probability. 
For what matters is that some uncertainties (broadly understood) 
be quantifiable. If this fact is ascertained then the frequentialist 
definition of probability may justifiably be adopted.
Finally, let us give some more substance to our claim that some 
uncertainties (broadly understood) matter since we can quantify 
them (risks). In order to do so we quote the incisive excerpt from 
Knight’s (1971: 212–13) magnum opus:
“[…], the bursting of bottles does not introduce an uncertainty or 
hazard into the business of producing champagne; since in the oper-
ations of any producer a practically constant and known proportion 
of bottles burst, it does not especially matter even whether the pro-
portion is large or small. The loss becomes a fixed cost. . . . And even 
if a single producer does not deal with a sufficiently large number of 
cases of the contingency in question . . . to secure constancy in its 
effects, the same result may easily be realized, through an organiza-
tion taking in a large number of producers. This, of course, is the 
principle of insurance, as familiarly illustrated by the chance of fire 
loss. No one can say whether a particular building will burn, and 
most building owners do not operate on a sufficient scale to reduce 
the loss to constancy. . . . But as is well known, the effect of insurance 
is to extend this base to cover the operations of a large number of 
persons and convert the contingency into a fixed cost.”
35 The implicit expectation accompanying all the actuarial data is that similar fre-
quencies will obtain in the near future. Needless to say that this expectation is not a 
matter of necessity but rather of contingency.
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Do we really, in the light of the fact that “a practically constant 
and known proportion of bottles burst”, need to delve into the 
problem of “the correct (sic!)” definition of probability when the 
only thing that matters here is the discovery of bottles-not-burst-
ing-to-bottles-bursting ratio? This certainly is a rhetorical ques-
tion. What is more, we can even concede, arguendo, the point to 
Crovelli that the universe is governed by time-invariant causa-
tion. But by no means does this force us to adopt his subjective 
definition of probability. A sufficient condition for any probabil-
ity talk (be it class or case probability) is an element of our igno-
rance. In the example cited above, we are not sure which 
particular bottle is going to burst but it hardly matters for we 
know everything about the entire class of such events (that is, we 
know the overall proportion of bottles bursting) to turn this con-
tingency into a fixed cost.
IV 
DETERMINISM CALLS FOR SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY – 
CROVELLI’S NON-SEQUITUR FALLACY
As was hinted in passing above, even the assumption of determin-
ism does not oblige us to adopt the subjective definition of proba-
bility. We claim that this is a non-sequitur on Crovelli’s part. That 
this author clings to the idea that invariable causal powers impose 
on us the subjective definition of probability is evidenced in what 
follows (2010: 8– 9):
“If the world is deterministic, in the sense that every event has a 
cause of some sort, then any uncertainty man might have about 
what goes on in the world must be a result in man’s own mental 
limitations. Probability in such a world would thus necessarily be a 
measure of man’s subjective beliefs about the world, rather than an 
‘objective’ measure of a property that exists in the world, because all 
outcomes, events and phenomena in a causally deterministic world 
have absolutely certain causes. If man were in a position to know in 
advance all of the causal factors affecting any given event or 
phenomenon, he would not have to resort to the round-about 
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methods of probability to predict outcomes. He would know in 
advance, and for certain, whether any given event would or 
would not occur.”
We tackle this argument by Crovelli on two counts. First, let us 
test it for the validity of its entailment. We assume for the sake of 
argument the antecedent; that is, the world is deterministic. We still 
part company with Crovelli as far as the consequent goes; to wit, 
we do not believe that what necessarily follows is the validity of 
subjective beliefs. On the other hand, Crovelli is right saying that 
there would be no need to employ any concept of probability if man 
were omniscient. Fair enough, ignorance is a necessary (and suffi-
cient!) prerequisite for the concept of probability to be operative. 
Yet, it does not follow that since ignorance is obviously of an episte-
mological (rather than an ontological36) nature, probability must 
refer to subjective beliefs. Before we consider what aspects of real-
ity obtained frequencies reflect, we should most empathically stress 
that we share Crovelli’s intuition (although that is not the only 
coherent world-view by any means) that once all the physical condi-
tions of throwing a dice are specified (its momentum, the angle at 
which it is thrown, the distance from the floor etc.), they necessitate 
one particular outcome. In other words, if all the values of all the 
variables relevant to the prediction of an outcome are known, there 
would be no room for probability qualifications since a given out-
come would be certain. Still, we claim that by obtaining frequen-
cies we do learn something about reality. Let us consider what we 
learn when the limiting frequency value for heads when tossing a 
coin is about 1/2. We side with Crovelli believing that if all the var-
iables causally involved in bringing about either heads or tails were 
known for sure, either result would be known in advance and with 
absolutely certainty. Yet, the values of all these variables are not 
known (in particular, we are in the dark as to what is the momen-
tum of a coin toss, what is its exact distance to the floor etc.) So, 
what do we learn when we obtain in the long run roughly 1/2 fre-
quency for heads? We claim that we learn that the coin is unbiased; 
36 After all, Crovelli (2010) argues that the world is governed by time-invariant 
causation.
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for all the other variables are by definition randomly distributed 
over all the tosses in the experiment. After all, we do not control for 
momentum. Neither is the distance from the floor fixed. We simply 
do not care about all the other causal factors. What remains constant 
throughout the experiment is the dice itself! All the other factors 
(momentum, angle, distance etc.) are necessarily random then.37 
Therefore, this result of the experiment sheds light on reality (that 
is, on the geometry of a dice) and not on subjective beliefs. This 
clearly runs counter to Crovelli’s insight.
Second of all, we believe that by no means it is necessary to 
assume time-invariant causation. There is substantial literature on 
the so-called objective chance and propensity.38 To that effect, let us 
quote Mackie (1973: 179–180):
“Objective chance is a counterpart of the power of necessity in 
causes for which Hume looked in vain. Just as the power in a cause 
would be something present in every instance of a certain kind of 
cause which somehow guaranteed the subsequent occurrence of 
the corresponding effect, so a penny’s having, at each toss, a cer-
tain chance of falling heads and a certain (perhaps different) 
chance of falling tails would be something present in the initial 
stages of every individual tossing process which tended to produce 
the result ‘heads’ and tended to produce the result ‘tails’, where 
these tendencies might be either equal or unequal. A clearer exam-
ple might be a four-sided top which, when it stopped spinning, 
would lie with one of the four sides (marked ‘1’, ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘4’) 
37 Obviously, we make a tacit assumption after Kries (1886, p. 55), who believed 
that other causal factors, across their respective extensions, contribute equally to brin-
ging about either 1,2,3,4,5 or 6 falling uppermost on a dice. To clarify, let us assume 
that the outcome of a dice is a function of the geometry of a dice and the momentum 
of its throw. The momentum may vary across some spectrum. Kries believed that 
when this spectrum is divided into 6 equal sub-spectra, any value within each of 
them, ceteris paribus, will bring about their respective outcomes. In other words, given 
a certain geometry of a dice, if sub-spectrum 1obtains (that is, the dice was thrown 
with the momentum ranging from 0-1), the dice will fall 1 uppermost; if sub-spectrum 
2 obtains (that is, the dice was thrown with the momentum ranging from 1-2), the dice 
will fall 2 uppermost etc.
38 Normally, it is Popper (1957) who is credited with the invention of propensity 
interpretation of probability. This author’s concern was – among others – to make 
sense of assigning probabilities to single cases in the realm of quantum mechanics.
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uppermost. Each spin of this top might have a certain chance-distri-
bution, say 0,3, for side 1, 0.26 for side 2, 0.2 for side 3, and 0.24 for 
side 4. That is, the tendencies in this case would be nearly but not 
quite equal, the tendency for the top to come to rest with side 1 up 
would be the strongest, with side 3 the weakest, and the others in 
between. (The chances in such a chance-distribution would tend to 
produce the various results, but of course would not guarantee any 
of them. It would, presumably, guarantee a distribution of limiting 
frequencies in an indefinitely extended sequence of spins corre-
sponding exactly to the distribution of chances, provided that the 
top and the way of spinning it did not change.”
The last sentence of this illuminating quote is crucial. The anal-
ogy to our previous analysis (with the dice being of the correct geom-
etry and every other factor randomly varying) is crystal-clear. In the 
case of the spin invoked by Mackie, once we know that the world is 
basically governed by objective chances (propensities) and not by 
invariant causes, our empirically obtained frequencies can reflect those 
objective dispositions (propensities) in question! To guarantee this, it 
would be enough to control for other variables. With the values of 
other variables fixed, it would be a varying objective chance that 
would be reflected by the duly obtained frequencies. To give but one 
example, if the objective chances are as specified by Mackie, the rel-
ative frequencies (of the spin lying on side 1, 2, 3 or 4) obtained in an 
experiment controlling for all the other variables should in the long 
run exactly reflect the ratios of their respective objective chances. 
This is stipulated in Mackie’s example. Concluding, we hope that he 
managed to show that even if the antecedent in Crovelli’s reasoning 
is sound, the whole reasoning is still an instance of the non-sequitur. 
And finally, we cast some doubt on time-invariant causality showing 
that objective chances are seriously considered; and what is more, it 
is frequencies that can illuminate the former.
V 
CONCLUSION
We are grateful to Crovelli (2010). In the lexicon of criticisms of 
Ludwig von Mises, his contribution stands head and shoulders 
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over most of them, all too many of which amount to mere 
name-calling. In contrast, this author’s condemnation was thought-
ful, reasonable and well-articulated. However, we cannot see our 
way clear to agreeing with him regarding his major thesis.
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